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Case ana Comment
B O L S T E R  v. B O LST ER  (1953) 32 M .P.R . 143.
Infants — Custody of — Primary Right of Father to Custody
In this case the C ourt oncc more was given the vcrv difficult task 
of awarding custody of children of a marriage that failed. It is settled 
law that the welfare of infants is paramount to all other considerations, 
and if the children’s welfare is better served by g iv in g  them into custody 
of one parent, rather than the other, the order will be made according* 
Iv. But in the ease under discussion, the Court was concerned with the 
situation which arose when there was nothing in the evidence to show 
that the children would be better eared for by one parent than the other.
T h e  Bolsters were married in 1944 and lived together until 1951, 
when a quarrel took place between them. Mrs. Bolster took the two 
children of the marriage and went to her parents’ home, telling her 
husband there was no room for him. Shortly after this the father applied 
for custodv of the two children, and as a result, a consent order, giving 
custody o f the voungcr child to the father and the elder to the mother, 
was made by Hughes J. At the time, the children were aged seven and 
three years respectively. Later, on an action brought b\ the husband 
for divorce alleging adultery on the part of his wire, the Judge of the 
Divorce Court refused to grant the divorce. On June 5, 1952, the wife 
filed a petition for custody of both children, and M r. Justice Hughes 
awarded custody of the two children to her. This appeal was then taken 
bv the husband, seeking custody of the two children, and the order 
of the Trial Judge was reversed.1
Richards C . J., (dissenting) agreed with Hughes }. that on the 
evidence, the interest of the cnildren would be better served if thcv 
were given into custody of their mother. Harrison J., with whom 
Michaud C .J.Q .B .D . concurred, based his judgment on the case of 
Rev. v. Sharpe; Ex parte Sharpe.- In that case the Court adopted the 
judgment o f  Barker }. in Re Armstrong,4 where it was held that the 
Court on application for custody of children would take into considera­
tion: (1) the paternal rights, (2) the marital duty of husband and wife so 
to live that tne children will have the benefit of their joint care and af­
fection, and (3) the interest of the children. Barker J. also made this 
statement:
As lo the prim ary right of I he father to the custody of his infant children 
there tr.ti be no doubt.*
1. 32 M .P.R. 143 iN.B. C.A.I.
2 H920i, 48 N.B.R 483.
3. (1895i, 1 N.B. Eq. 208.
4. Ibid.. at p. 210.
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As to the nature of this priman right. Barker J. in In Re Hatfield* 
added:
Mon: than this I think the author'¡ties arc verv plain aikl positive that 
the habits and ch arad cr of the father must be open to the gravest o b ­
jection to defeat this right.
In the Bolster ease, Harrison J. reiterated these words and in decid­
ing tlij*' issue said:
l pon a careful reading of the affidavit' and the evidence. I cannot find 
am  sufficient evidence to deprive the father of his primary right to 
custodv .•>
B y  the common law of FnH and the father had what was almost 
an absolute right to the custom of his children. It was practically 
impossible for the mother to make a sufficient showing of unfitness 
against the father in order to induce the Court to give a decision 
unfavourable to him. Cases which appear in the Knglish reports show 
that, although the father’s habits and character were of the most ob- 
jcctionablc sort, lie was still not deprived of the custodv of his legiti­
mate children. This right of the father was due to his superior position 
in the family household. T h e  Chancellor, moreover, while undoubtcd- 
lv having jurisdiction to determine the custody of the child, was re­
stricted by the very practical consideration of the legal status of mar­
ried women. T h e inferior position of married women at common 
law with regard to their property and income made it highly imprac­
ticable to remove the child from the father’s custodv to give it to the 
mother. For many years, however, the tendency of legislative action 
and of judicial decision, as well as of general opinion, has been to 
give to married women a higher status both as regards propertv and 
person. T his trend is illustrated bv the rights accorded women under 
sTTcii Acts as The Married W om en ’s Property Act and the Representa­
tion of the People Acts of 1918 and 1928.
T his movement, of course, directly affected the father’s exalted 
position in the family. By conferring rights and privileges on the wife 
and mother, the power and authority accorded to the husband and 
father were diminished. In family matters the duty of the husband 
and welfare of the children were brought into greater prominence. In 
discussing the effect of the Guardianship of Infants A ct7 in In  re A and 
B. (Infants)* Lopes L . J. said:
Kadi step in legislation has been to confer privileges on the wife with 
regard to the custody of and access to her children . . .  to m itigate the 
severity of the common law has been the object of the Legislature ever 
since 1839 when Lord T alfo ur's Act was passed. In 188(5 came the Act 
in question. I he Guardianship of Infants Act; and that again, more 
than any Act before increases the rights and privileges of the m other; 
in 111 y judgment s. 1 was inserted expresslv for the purpose of increasing 
and enlarging these rights.**
5. (18951, 1 N.B. Eq. 142. at p. 143.
6. 32 M.P.R. 143, at p. 150.
7. 118861, 49 & 50 Vic. c. 27.
8. 118971 1 Ch. 786.
9 Ib id..  at p. 791
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In arguing the case for the mother in Rex v. Sharpe; E x  parte 
Sharper counsel relied 011 In re A. and B. (Infants).8 W h ite  J., 011 com ­
paring s. 5 of the English Act of 1886 with Order 56, Rule 11, of the 
judicature Act of New Brunswick, rejected counsel’s argument, saying:
We have in this province today no statutory enactm ent giving to the 
wife upon application by petition to the Court of Kquity wider rights than 
she had at the time In te Armstrong was decided.1'*
T h e  Armstrong case was decidcd in 1895, and represents the present 
state of our law, as is indicated by the decision in Bolster v. Bolster. In 
this province a mother docs not even have the privileges conferred by 
the English A ct of 1886, while in England the more reccnt Act of 
192  ̂ gives the mother a right equal to that of the father. T h is A ct 
(1925) rccitcs that Parliament, by the Sex Disqualification (Removal) 
Act 11 and various other enactm ents, has sought to establish equality 
in law between the sexes, and that it is expedient that this principle 
should obtain with respect to the guardianship of infants and tne rignts 
and responsibilities conferred thereby. T h e  Act expressly states that the 
C ourt, in deciding any question in regard to custody or upbringing of 
an infant, shall regard the welfare of tlie infant as the paramount con­
sideration, and shall not take into consideration from any other point 
of view whether the claim of the father, or any right of common law 
possessed by the father is superior to that of the m other.12 In Canada, 
the provinces of O ntario, M anitoba and British Columbia all have 
enactm ents to the same effect; Saskatchewan even gives the mother 
a prima facie right to her children under fourteen years of age.
T h e  “primary right of the father”, which is still recognized in New 
Brunswick, is an anachronism in our law. Considering the legal status 
accorded the married woman today ,it is a concept which is completely 
incongruous in point of time. W h en  custody problems arise between 
the parents, the Courts should, in the words or Beck J. A. in Leboeuf 
v. Leboeuf,13 consider the following:
I he param ount consideration is the welfare of the children; subsidiary to 
this and as a means o f arriving at llie best ansxeer to that question  
(italics mine) are the conduct of the respective parents, the wishes of 
the m other as well as of the father, the ages and sexes of the children, the 
proposals of each parent for the m aintenance and education of the ch il­
dren; their stations and aptitudes and prospects in life; the pecuniary 
circumstances of the father and m other . . . not for the purpose of giving 
the custody to the parent in the better financial position to m aintain and 
educate the children, but for fixing the am ount to be paid by one or both 
parents for the m aintenance of the children. T h e  religion in which the 
children are to be brought up is always a m atter for consideration . . . .
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10. (1920), 48 N.B.R. 483. at p. 498
11. (19191, 9 & 10 Geo. V, c. 71.
12. The Guardianship of Infants Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. V. c. 45, s. 1.
13. [1928] 2 D.L.R. 23, at p. 24.
